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The 2000 S.C. Lottery Vote:
Shadowsof the Past and Projections
of the Future
Robert E. Botsch
USC Aiken
Carol S. Botsch
USC Aiken
The successful passage of the South Carolina "education
lottery " referendum in 2000 is explained in terms of regional differences that reflect differences in religion, racial and ethnic composition, partisan identifications , and
political culture . A key variable in understanding
the
outcome is the changing political
culture of the state .
The dominant traditionalistic
and morally conservative
cultural mix has sometimes been challenged by individualistic rejection
of government
regulation , including
regulations on gambling , which has a long history in the
state. Though the regional differences
in culture from
historical settlement patterns can still be seen , the balance of power has begun to shift as less morally conservative outsiders
move into the state and as citizens
recognize the importance of public education . Many antigovernment traditionalists
hoped the lottery would provide better education and lower taxes at the same time.
INTRODUCTION

n 2000 the voters of South Carolina passed a statewide referendum to amend the state constitution so as to allow an
"education lottery" for the state. The purpose of this paper is
to explain the outcome in terms of key variables that both reflect
the past of the Palmetto State and project changes into its future:
region, religion, race, partisanship, and culture.
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South Carolina is still a morally conservative and a politically
traditionalistic state that is characterized by low levels of political participation, social and political deference to the elite, and
government actions that focus more on preserving the status quo
than promoting the general welfare (Elazar, xxix-xxx). Another
aspect of the state's southern culture is an exaggerated sense of
individualism that rejects most government regulation and demands that each person look out for him or herself (Botsch) . This
tendency to reject government regulations sometimes comes into
conflict with the long-standing role of government in preservi ng
standards of conservative morality in the Bible Belt. A growing
recognition by most residents that the state needs more resources
for public education adds to the conflict over the proper role of
government in contemporary South Carolina. This recogni tion
could be seen in the heavy emphasis both gubernatoria l candidates placed on improving education in the 2002 election.
The population of South Carolina grew by 15.1% in the
1990s, in part because of in-migration as people moved from
colder northern climates to the South. In the year 2000 alone, the
state was seventh in the country among the shipments of household goods handled by the country's largest mover. 1 Based on an
analysis of census data long forms, during the last half of the
1990s, from 1995 through 2000, more than 132,000 more people
moved to the state than left the state, and they came most frequently from New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, in that
order. In comparing states, this represented the ninth largest net
gain in the nation.2 The new South Carolinians arrived with their
own political cultures, which, as we shall see, helped shift the
balance of power in the outcome of the 2000 lottery referen dum.

1

2

Tim Flach, "Migration boosts S.C. population," The State, 22 January 2002, B-1 .
Chris Roberts, "Migration to S.C. on the Rise," The State , 6 August 2003, A-3 .
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Although various forms of gambling were popular in early
South Carolina, by the late 1800s lotteries had fallen out of favor. The delegates to the 1895 constitutional convention outlawed the practice. However, some eighty years later, bingo
became legal as a means to raise money for charities. Video
poker was legal through much of the 1980s and 1990s, becoming
part of a political battle that foreshadowed the battle over a lottery and playing a role in Governor David Beasley's 1998 defeat
in his re-election bid by Democrat Jim Hodges. Hodges favored
holding a referendum on video poker and made an education
lottery a key plank in his platform.3 But in October of 1999 the
State Supreme Court ruled that a proposed referendum on video
poker was unconstitutional, while upholding a portion of the
same law that banned video poker as of July of 2000.4 After his
election, Hodges pushed for a referendum on the lottery. Much
of the rhetoric during the lottery battle focused on morality and
on the need to improve education. Speaking to a group of educators, Hodges argued "there is no greater crisis in our state than
the education crisis." Kathy Bigham, chair of "No Lottery 2000,"
an anti-lottery group, responded by stating "I do believe that if
we fund education with gambling that we will create a moral
crisis for all South Carolinians."5 Blacks, a key group of Democ3

Chuck Carroll and Douglas Pardue, "Kings & Jokers," The State, I August 1999, A-1,
A-9-12; Melissa Manware, "Lancaster group mobilizes against gambling ," The State, 7
September 1999, B-3 ; "Video Gambling Chronology ," The AugustaCJ,ronicJe,
24 JlDlC2(XX),
Availableoo the internet:htip://www.au~cle
.com'stori~__pokertime.shtrnl.
• John Allard, "The Supreme Court decision," The State, 15 October 1999, A-13, A-15;
Sammy Fretwell, "The Supreme Court decision," The State, 15 October 1999, A-13, A15.; Kenneth A Harris, "In the courtroom, the lobbyists couldn't help," The State, 15
October 1999, Al 4; Clif LeBlanc and Chuck Carroll, "Lawsuit seeks to undermine poker
vote," The State, 4 September 1999, B-1, B-4.
5
Aaron Shein in, "Hodges says lottery can help solve education crisis," The State, 7 September 2000 , B-3.
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ratic voters, were targeted during the campaign because they
were likely to support the lottery as a means of improving education, despite the opposition of their own religious leaders. Thus,
many of the pro-lottery advertisements focused on how a lottery
could help improve education. 6
Most major newspapers in the state also took editorial positions opposing the lottery, again using the rhetoric of morality.
By and large, South Carolina's religious community opposed the
lottery. In October of 2000, approximately four weeks prior to
the referendum, more than 300 clergy and religious leaders from
a variety of denominations stood outside of the State House to
read a statement opposing the lottery. Among the opponents were
representatives from the Black community, a key constituency
for any southern state seeking passage of a lottery.7 Although
church leaders expressed support for education, they argued that
the lottery was "immoral," would "dirninish ... good government," and was contrary to the teachings of the Bible. 8
In the end, the lottery referendum passed with the support of
54% of the voters. 9 Blacks proved critical to its passage, with
75% voting in favor of the lottery. A modest majority of whites,
55%, voted against it. 10
REGION, RELIGION, RACE AND POLITICAL CULTURE

While most states have a distinctive political culture, one can
find cultural differences within any single state. South Carolina
6

John Monk , "Hodges put machine to work for lottery," The State 9 November 1999, B1, B-2 .
7
Allison Askins , "Christian churches unite to oppose lottery," The State 3 October 2000,
B-1, B-5 .
' Askins, supra.
'Valerie Bauerlein and Aaron Sheinin, "Opponents stressing details," The State, 9 November 2000, B-1, B-3.
10
Lee Bandy and Chris Roberts , "Black vote clinched lottery win," The State, 9 November 2000, B-1, B-7.
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is no exception. Many observers divide the state into two or three
different cultural sections (Wallace; Writers' Program; Moreland,
Steed, and Baker). The upcountry or Piedmont plateau is the
northwestern half of the state. The lowcountry or the coastal
plain is the lower southeastern section . The dividing line is defined by the first set of rapids on rivers-the "fall line." Sometimes the "midlands" are distinguished from the upcountry and
lowcountry, though their topological distinctiveness is less precise. For the purposes of this paper and simplicity, we shall restrict our distinction to only the upcountry and the lowcountry.
Geography and topography had a great impact on who settled
in these regions and how they lived and prospered. With different
people came different cultural baggage. Dissimilar lifestyles increased those differences. Moreover, the institution of slavery
and later the economic stagnation following the Civil War prevented any great in-migration of outsiders to dilute those differences.
Anglican aristocrats and large numbers of enslaved Africans
settled the lowcountry, where the economy centered around the
plantation. They generally built their plantations below the fall
line because large farming operations were less practical above
the fall line . Topography and soil conditions were less favorable,
and in addition, the rapids made impractical the transportation of
large amounts of agricultural products to the coast for export.
Even today one can find statistically significant differences in the
percentage of Episcopalians, who are the religious descendents
of Anglicans, among the regions of the state. More members of
this small, relatively liberal religious group are found in the lowcountry. Moreover, despite generations of social upheaval and
great migrations, the percentage of Blacks living in lowcountry
and midlands counties is far higher than in the upcountry.
Scotch-Irish and Germans migrated to the upcountry, and
scratched out a living on small farms above the fall line. They
VOL. 32 2004
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brought with them their religions, which contained many moral
prohibitions, including a prohibition on gambling. They were
more likely to be part of the great religious awakenings in early
American history, taking their moral beliefs into the Baptist
churches that were springing up like mushrooms across the
South Carolina frontier. Moreover, they held the people and culture of the lowcountry in great disdain (Moreland, Steed, and
Baker, 7). Even today one finds significantly more people who
claim Irish heritage in the upcountry than in the lowcountry. The
same is true of Scottish, though to a lesser extent. There is a
large regional difference in those who claim adherence to the
Southern Baptist church. In the average upcountry county, a full
third of the population count themselves as Southern Baptists, as
compared to a fifth of the population in lowcountry counties.
Every culture has some internal contradictions. So it is with
the socially and morally conservative traditionalistic culture of
South Carolina. It may well be the most traditionalistic of all
states (Elazar, xxx). It does not have an individualistic culture
because South Carolinians do not see politics as a competitive
business in which government provides services in return for
votes (Elazar, xxvii). But the state's political culture contains one
strong element of the individualistic culture. South Carolinians
have long seen the private realm as of greater importance than
the public realm, even when they are in great need of public
help. Historically, South Carolinians have rejected collective action in favor of individual attempts to survive, even when the
collective efforts of common people were the only way to combat the power of those who ran mill towns and controlled the
land in rural areas (Botsch). Individualism expressed through
extreme notions of self-reliance, volunteerism, and of individual
and family honor that can be defended through violent outbursts
have all been noted by many observers of southern life, culture
and politics (Cash, 349-40; Reed, 33, 43; Havard, 702-3).
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Even the dominant religious institution of the white South,
the Southern Baptist Church, reflects the individualistic element
of southern culture. Until the 1990s, when conservative elements
took over the reins of the organization, a prime belief of the
church was the "priesthood of the believer." No leader was to tell
members how to interpret scriptures or create any official doctrine of the church. That was all left to individuals and to individual churches. Although few took these freedoms outside the
conservative moral consensus and although those who did were
often socially ostracized, the right was cherished in principle, if
not in practice.
In the context of the issue of central concern in this paper, the
2000 lottery vote, the individualistic ethic of South Carolinians
presented an obstacle to religious leaders. While those most
closely tied to formal religious organizations tended to call for
government restrictions on the right of any person to throw his or
her money to the winds of chance, those who were less closely
tied to conservative religious groups were much more difficult to
influence. Playing the lottery might be a sin, but that was between each person and his or her Maker, not something government should prohibit.
COUNTY AND REGIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

If we examine the lottery vote on a county-by-county basis,
we can see several patterns in terms of region, religion, race, and
partisanship, all of which illuminate these cultural differences
and contradictions. Let us briefly examine each one.
The regional differences in the state had a dramatic impact on
the lottery vote. In Figure 1, the darkened line running in a northeasterly direction across the middle of South Carolina divides
the state into upcountry counties and lowcountry counties. The
darker colors on the map correspond to greater support for the
lottery. As one moves from the upcountry to the lowcountry,
VOL. 32 2004
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FIGURE 1
AND PERCENTAGE FAVORING LOTTERY
BY COUNTIES IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 2000
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support for the lottery grew. The average vote for the lottery in
counties above the fall line was 49.3%, while the average "yes"
vote in lowcountry counties was 61.4%.
One should note that even though upcountry counties rejected
the lottery, the margin was extremely narrow. The overwhelming
vote in the lowcountry was more than enough to turn the tide.
This finding is consistent with regional patterns long observed in
South Carolina political history. For example, the mini-bottle
referendum of 1972 also fell along regional lines. Twelve of the
fourteen counties that rejected the proposed constitutional
change to allow the sale of liquor in mini-bottles were in the upcountry (Moreland, Steed, and Baker, 13).
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As noted above, regional differences are shorthand for racial
and religious differences, as well as the partisan differences that
correspond with race and religion. We cannot easily separate
these things out using aggregate data. However, the expected
patterns are clearly present. In terms of race, one sees the same
pattern as one sees with the lottery vote. The correlation between
percentage Black population and support for the lottery was
+.63.
Religion was also clearly at work. Southern Baptists are the
largest religious denomination in the state, and they are almost
exclusively white. Where relatively many Southern Baptists
lived, the lottery did badly. The correlation between percentage
Southern Baptists and the pro lottery votes in counties is a -.54.
However, because so few Blacks are affiliated with the
Southern Baptist denomination, one might suspect that this relationship is purely spurious. While that may explain part of what
we see on this map, having a lot of white adherents among the
Southern Baptists plays at least some role. We regressed percentage Baptist on percentage voting for the lottery and then added
percentage black as another independent variable. While the
standardized correlation coefficient for percentage Baptist did
drop, it and percentage black both remained statistically significant predictors. While this evidence is less than totally conclusive, it does strongly suggest that the percentage of Southern
Baptists in a county had an effect independent of race in reducing the pro-lottery vote. 11
Race and Southern Baptists arc strongly negatively correlated (r = -.468, p < .01), so
multicollinearity is a significant problem in interpreting any regression . We controlled for
race in another less fonnal way by pairing counties with similar racial compositions but
different Southern Baptist compositions . We were able to identify eight pairs of counties
in which the racial compositions were within two percentage points of each other while
the percentage of the populations that were Southern Baptist adherents were quite different. When a third or fourth county had a similar percentage of Black residents, we chose
the pair in which the differences in Southern Baptists were greatest. In the two pairs with
Note continues
11
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Turning to partisanship, we can approximate the Democratic
vote in each county by the percentage that Democratic candidate
Jim Hodges received in the 1998 election. As noted earlier,
Hodges had made creating an "education lottery" a major part of
his campaign. The correlation between the 1998 vote for Hodges
and the 2000 lottery vote was +.67. However, we must be careful
about drawing a firm conclusion, because Hodges did extremely
well in counties with a large Black vote. So the relationship may
be as much or even more the result of the voting behavior of
Blacks, who are also the most loyal Democratic partisans in the
state. When we regressed both percentage black and percentage
for Hodges on the percentage for the lottery, percentage black
dropped out as a significant predictor. Unlike the situation with
Southern Baptists, we cannot separate out the influence of race
from partisanship.12
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

One can only do so much analysis using aggregate data because aggregate data can only suggest how individuals behave.
To analyze individual behavior we will turn to an exit poll perthe highest percentage Black population, the relationship is not as expected. The county
with the higher percentage Southern Baptist reported a higher percentage of votes for the
lottery than the counties with which they are paired . All four counties in these first two
pairs are lowcountry counties with very high percentages of Blacks in the population
(ranging from 54 to 63%). However, the other six pairs all have the hypothesized relationship . The county with the higher percentage Southern Baptist population reported a
lower percentage of votes for the lottery. What seems to be happening is that when the
percentage of Blacks is over 50%, the percentage of white Baptists in the county did not
increase lottery opposition. However, when the percentage of Blacks falls below 50%,
then the percentage of Southern Baptists in the county had a negative impact on votes for
the lottery.
12
Race and partisanship, as measured by the Hodges vote in 1998, arc correlated with
each other far more strongly (r = +.875, p < .01) than race and the Southern Baptists
(r = - .468 , p < .01 ) . Therefore, multicollinearity between race and partisanship is so
great that it is impossible to sort out the separate influences of these two variables on the
lottery vote.
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formed on Aiken County voters. 13 Aiken County lies on the dividing line between the upcountry and the lowcountry. It
matched the statewide results in that 54% of the voters in the
county approved the lottery, the same percentage as for the entire
state. Aiken is a county that has been greatly affected by the inmigration of non-southerners associated with the defense industry at the Savannah River Site, where tritium was extracted as a
component for nuclear weapons, and where today wastes are
stored and processed. Like many places in the state, it has also
developed a significant retirement population attracted by a
warm climate, low taxes, and nearby amenities and services.
Aiken has affluent golf communities, crumbling textile mill villages where generations of southerners have lived, and many
small farms. While we cannot generalize to the state as a whole,
we can certainly identify individual social and demographic factors that are associated with support of gambling that are at least
suggestive of the factors at play in the rest of the state.
The exit poll strongly suggests that a number of cultural,
demographic, and political factors were at play in explaining the
lottery vote. Race played a powerful role. The vote was almost
evenly split among whites, who divided 49% to 51% against the
lottery in the sample, a margin that is too close to call for the
general population. Among Blacks, however, the vote split 75%
in favor to 25% against, a clear vote for the lottery. We could not
13
Professor Robert Botsch 's Political Science Research Methods students perfonned the
exit poll on 568 voters in ten precincts . These precincts represented the different geographical and demographic parts of the county that had in the past been representative of
the county as a whole (such surveys have been perfonned since the early I 980s). The
students performed a systematic sampling technique in two different time slots for each
precincL They chose males and females in approximately equal numbers . The voting
results for the sample were well within the margin of sampling error for the actual votes
for the presidential election and the lottery referendum. One may reasonably conclude
that the sample approximates a random sample and is representative of the county voters
in that particular election.
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identify any subgroups of Blacks who opposed the lottery.
Among Blacks, regardless of education, income, religious fundamentalism, or frequency of church attendance, strong majorities favored the lottery. The shifts were in the expected directions
with support falling as education, income, and church attendance
went up. Self-identified fundamentalists were less likely to support the lottery than non-fundamentalists, but a majority still
supported the lottery over the objections of their religious leaders. Majorities of Blacks in every subgroup favored the lottery.
We thought that perhaps the explanation for Black support
might be more a function of income than race. The group of
whites most likely to support the lottery was low-income (less
than $25,000 family income) non-fundamentalists. But when we
compared these whites to similar blacks, black support was still
six percentage points higher (77% v. 71%, respectively). Just as
we found in looking at aggregate county level data, individual
data support the hypothesis that differences in racial subcultures
played a major role in the outcome of the election.
Because Black voting behavior on the lottery question was so
different than that of whites, we separated out whites to see what
factors influenced their votes. Several subgroups of whites did
give the lottery majority support: non-southerners, nonfundamentalists, those who do not attend church, those with family incomes of less than $25,000 a year, those in two education
groups (less than high school and with some college but less than
four years), those who strongly agreed that more money needed
to be spent on education in the state, and those who hoped that
proceeds could be used to reduce taxes spent on education. Let
us briefly discuss each of these factors, the impacts of which are
summarized in Table 1.
As noted earlier, the in-migration of people who do not consider themselves Southerners and who bring with them the culture of other regions of the nation is slowly changing the culture
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FACTORS EXPLAINING
VOTER SUPPORT FOR THE LOTTERY IN

Sub-Groups

2000

Percent
for
Lottery

Significance
of
Difference

48%
64%

.06

39%
57%

.00

69%
48%
21%

.00

62%
48%

.06

57%
46%

.02

60%
39%

.00

55%
49%

.02

70%
44%

.00

Region
self-identified Southerners
self-identified non-Southerners
Religious Fundamentalism
religious fundamentalists
non-religious fundamentalists
Church attendance
none in last week
once in past week
several times in past week
Family Income
Jess than $25,000
more than $25,000
Education
Jess than high school or 1-3 years college
high school or college degree or more
More Money for Education in SC
"strongly agree"
"agree" to "strongly disagree"
Use Money to Reduce Taxes
"strongly agree" to mixed
"disagree" to "strongly disagree"
Political Party
Democrats
Republicans

of South Carolina. According to U.S. Census figures, in 1990
just over 69% of all residents were native to the state. Between
1990 and 2000 the percentage of natives dropped ten percentage
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points to 59% native. Many of these in-migrants come from
states that already have lotteries. They are also less likely to
bring with them socially conservative values associated with religious fundamentalism. In our sample of Aiken County voters,
nearly half of all whites who considered themselves southern ers
also identified themselves as religious fundamentalists. Less than
one in six non-southern whites were fundamentalists. These inmigrants seem to have voted differently on the lottery questi on
than natives (the difference between self-identified south ern
whites and non-southern whites was right on the edge of statistical significance at p = .06). As in-migrants grow in number their
impact on the cultural mix will be felt more and more.
Religious fundamentalism and frequency of church attendance had a strong impact on white voting. Combining these two
factors had a powerful impact on the vote. A little over 80% of
whites who were fundamentalists and who attended church several times each week voted against the lottery. But only a little
more than 10% of the sample fit into this category (62 of 568).
Religiously active fundamentalist whites are but a small porti on
of the electorate and will only make a difference when the larger
and more secular part of the electorate is evenly split on some
question or when voting turnout is low.
Whites in the lowest income groups (less than $25,000 family
income) seemed to be on the opposite side of the lottery questi on
than those in higher income groups. The difference was right on
the border of what is considered a statistically significant relationship. However, if we look at the full range of income groups,
we see what appears to be a far more complex relationship, although the subgroups are far too small to produce anything close
to statistical significance. Support falls below 50% when income
of white families is between $25,000 and $40,000, but then it
rises slightly above 50% again in the higher income groups up to
$100,000, but again falls below 50% in the over $100,000 group .
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This suggests that opposition was greatest within the white lower
middle class. This is not a function of religious fundamentalism
because a higher percentage of whites in the lowest income
groups are fundamentalists than whites in lower middle or high
income groups.
Education also has a complex relationship with the lottery
vote among whites. The relationship is similar to what we saw in
examining income. The greatest support comes from those with a
less than high school education (72%), followed by those with
one to three years of college (55%). The greatest opposition
comes from those with education beyond a college degree (only
42% favored). Those with a high school degree and those with a
college degree also opposed the lottery (46% and 48% favored
respectively), but were more evenly split than those with the
highest level of education.
One possible explanation could be differences in the understanding of the issue. Presumably education should work to increase citizen understanding of issues. The more one knows
about the lottery the more one might question the value of the
lottery to improve education and the more one should understand
disparate impact on economic classes. We asked several factual
questions about the lottery to see how well-informed voters were
on the issue. Education had no relation to knowledge about the
percentage impact the lottery would have on total education
spending in the state (a less than 5% increase). All education
groups grossly overestimated the impact. Nor did education have
any relation to knowledge of how much of the lottery proceeds
would go to education (about a third). Most again grossly overestimated the money for education. However, the highest education group (those with post college education) was significantly
more likely to know that the lottery would take more money
from the poor than from those who are better off. Two-thirds of
this highest edu1,;atedgroup gave the correct answer. Only about
VOL. 32 2004
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a fourth of those with less than a high school education knew
that it would cost the poor more. About half of those in the middle education groups gave the correct answer. So an altruistic
concern for the poor among those who were most well educated-not knowledge about the impact of the lottery on education-may best explain their lack of support for the lottery. We
have no explanation as to why those with some college may have
been more supportive than those with just high school degrees,
except that they were more likely to be non-Southerners. 1•
The political culture of South Carolina has long been one that
opposed increased taxes or expanded government services. On
the other hand, a long, slow process of public education may be
awakening voters to the fact that the state can never make improvements without more resources devoted to education. Nearly
90% of the voters in our exit poll were on the "agree" side of the
statement that "more money is needed for education in South
Carolina" (54% "strongly" agreed). Nearly three-fourths agreed
with the statement "public school teachers in South Carolina
who meet national standards should have their salaries raised to
the national average, even if that means raising taxes" (here the
"strongly agrees" and "agrees" were about evenly split).
An "education lottery" fits well with both the older anti-tax
culture and the newer reali:zation that improvements in public
14
In a countywide telephone survey performed in 1999, we found similar and even more
striking results . In this survey we asked a series of eight political knowledge questions
(such as the terms of U.S. House and Senate members and names of South Carolina's two
U.S. Senators) and also asked about whether they supported the lottery. We found that
those who were more politically knowledgeable were significantly more likely to oppose
the lottery (p = .03 with whites only; the black subsample was too small to analyze by
itself). This telephone survey of 200 Aiken County adult residents was performed by
Professor Robert Botsch's Political Science Research Methods students . The sample was
selected using telephone numbers generated randomly. All numbers were called at least
four times before replacement, and the individual respondent in each household interviewed was chosen using the "most recent birthday" method so that they were randomly
chosen . The sampling error for this survey is plus or minus 7%.
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education require more resources. Nevertheless, only those with
the strongest level of support for more education spending were
moved to support the lottery. Only among those who "strongly"
agreed that more money is needed did the lottery garner majority
support. The question about raising teacher pay even if it meant
raising taxes had no bearing on the lottery vote. On the other
hand, one could see the old anti-tax culture at work in the vote.
We asked voters if they felt that lottery proceeds should be used
to lower existing taxes that support education. About two-thirds
of all the white voters agreed or had mixed feelings. As seen in
the table above, a majority of these voters favored the lottery.
Having at least mixed feelings about using proceeds to reduce
existing taxes played a role in explaining why many white voters
supported the lottery. Many apparently felt that a lottery would
allow them to in effect have their cake and eat it too-the state
could have more money for education and also lower taxes .
Partisanship played an important role in the outcome of the
lottery. The GOP tried to stay out of the lottery fight, even
though it officially opposed gambling in any form in its state
party platform. The issue was too divisive for the party because
many lowcountry Republicans were on the pro-lottery side. As
lottery supporter Republican state Senator Arthur Ravenel Jr. of
Charleston said, "We gamble, cuss, drink liquor and raise hell
down here. But we're very conservative with our sins." 15 The
white Democrats, on the other hand, voted to endorse the lottery
as the centerpiece of Governor Jim Hodges' education program
and spent money in its support. 16 The results, at least as seen in
Aiken County, indicate that white Democrats were more united
and far more likely to vote in favor, with 70% of all white De15

Lee Bandy, "Split on the lottery , GOP will stay out of the fight, " The State, JO September 2000, D-1 .
16
Bandy , supra .

VOL. 32 2004

92

BOTSCH

& BOTSCH

mocratic identifiers supporting the lottery. Only 40% of the Republicans supported the lottery. The lottery was an issue that at
least temporarily revived the state's Democratic Party. The lottery was a wedge issue that split the Republican Party, separating
its social and moral conservatives who live primarily in the upcountry from its relatively more permissive and individualistic
elements in the lowcountry.
CONCLUSION

The lingering shadows of centuries old ethnic settlement patterns on current regional, racial, and religious dynamics in South
Carolina contribute significantly to understanding the 2000 education lottery vote. Those historic patterns clearly help explain
the differential support for the lottery, which was stronger in
Iowcountry counties and weaker in upcountry counties. Those
patterns also help us explain related differences in support for the
lottery among voters of different religious backgrounds, races,
and partisan leanings.
Yet on-going changes in the state are also relevant to explaining the vote. As non-southerners move to the state, both the balance within each region and the political culture of the state as a
whole appear to be shifting. The upcountry is still most conservative on issues such as gambling, but conservatives have at best
a narrow majority. The state is still culturally conservative, but at
the same time it contains a strong individualistic element that
often rejects government prohibitions on gambling, just as it has
in the past rejected mandatory requirements for wearing motorcycle helmets. At the same time, as the lottery vote indicates, the
changing citizenry seems less willing than in the past to use government to enforce conservative standards of social morality. In
addition, the vote indicates that while Blacks may share the religious fundamentalism label with many white citizens and may
hear their religious leaders denounce the lottery as immoral,
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theirs is a different flavor of fundamentalism, as least respecting
an acceptance of games of chance. Most citizens of both races
recognize the need for more resources for public education, and
they have embraced the lottery as a kind of "voluntary tax" that
will provide some of those resources. A notable proportion
would even raise mandatory taxes. However, many still embrace
the hope that lottery proceeds will lower mandatory taxes that
the traditionalistic culture so detests.
The culture of South Carolina is slowly changing. The moral
conservatism of the upcountry is now battling to maintain its
dominance in that region, at least with respect to gambling. The
battle has long been over in the lowcountry, which never fully
embraced religious restrictions on individual morality. Regional
differences still exist, but those differences are fading into ever
more faint shadows as waves of in-migrants cast a new light on
the political culture of the state.
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